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Legal Perils of Parody and Burlesque
Thomas Paul Demeter*
P ARODY' AND BURLESQUE2 as art forms, and their conflicts with the
rights of the holder of the original copyrighted work, are subjects
of interest to both the layman and the lawyer. To analyze the status of
this conflict, several areas must be explored. The following discussion
includes a consideration of the current copyright law as it applies to
parody and burlesque, a history of parody and burlesque as a literary
form, and significant United States cases dealing with the problems of
the conflict.
Statutory and Common Law Rights of an Author
All copyright rights in the United States arise from the Constitu-
tion.3 Congress, based upon this warrant of authority, has established
statutory regulations of postpublication rights.4 However, prepublication
rights of the author remain controlled by the common law.
At common law the ownership of property in literary or intellectual
productions accrues to those who create them.5 The common law prop-
erty right in literary or intellectual productions exists independent of
and notwithstanding the copyright statutes, and entitles the author or
proprietor to the exclusive use of the production before publication.6
The Federal Copyright Act provides that the copyright statute is not
to be construed to annul or limit the common law or equity right of the
author or proprietor of an unpublished work to prevent the copying,
publication, or use of his unpublished work without his consent, and to
obtain relief from the invasion of that right.7 Therefore, as long as lit-
erary and artistic rights do not fall within the scope of the copyright
*B.S., Univ. of Akron; Third-year student, Cleveland-Marshall Law School.
1 Parody-A writing or rendition in which the language and style of an author or
work is closely imitated for comic effect or in ridicule, often with certain peculiar-
ities greatly heightened or exaggerated. See, Webster's New World Dictionary (Col-
lege ed., 1962), p. 1064.
2 Burlesque-A literary composition or dramatic representation that ridicules some-
thing, usually the serious and dignified but sometimes the trivial and commonplace
by means of grotesque exaggeration or comic imitation. See, Ibid.
A technical difference exists between parody and burlesque, with parody more
closely following the original work, and burlesque using greater exaggeration. The
terms will, however be used interchangeably in this paper.
3 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8.
4 17 U. S. C. (1958).
5 18 Am. Jur. 2d, Copyright and Literary Property, §§8, 310 (1965).
6 Frohman v. Ferris, 238 Ill. 430, 87 N.E. 327 (1909), aff'd 223 U.S. 424, 32 S. Ct. 263,
56 L. Ed. 492 (1911).
7 17 U.S.C. § 2 (1958).
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statute they are not affected thereby.8 In passing, we note that the Con-
gress currently is studying proposals to revise the Act.s"
A copyright is of statutory origin, and the rights secured to the
author or the copyright proprietor are those defined in the statuteY
Upon receipt of the copyright, the author or proprietor has the exclusive
right, for the specific period of the copyright protection, to print, reprint,
publish, copy, and vend his copyrighted work.' 0
All statutory actions for copyright infringement are based on Section
1 of the Federal Copyright Act which define the rights of the proprietor
of the copyright." Literary infringement actions arise out of Section
1 (a) which gives the copyright holder the exclusive right to ". . . print,
reprint, publish, copy, and vend the copyrighted work; . . ." 12
Most infringement actions involve the adopting of an idea, sequence,
or story line rather than verbatim copying. Rarely is the appropriator so
crude as to lift the plaintiff's words outright. The question of what con-
stitutes infringement becomes more difficult as the works of the author
and the appropriator become increasingly dissimilar or the context in
which the borrowed material is used grows less like the original.
Courts have generally resolved the problem by holding that sub-
stantial copying of the physical expression of the copyrighted work is an
essential element of a cause of action. 13 The courts have held that a
copyright does not protect ideas expressed in the work, but only the
physical expression of the idea. 14 Justice Story, in one of the earliest
copyright cases, gave an excellent and comprehensive criteria of what
constitutes infringement. He said,
.... In short, we must often, in deciding questions of this sort, look
to the nature and objects of the selections made, the quantity and
value of the materials used, and the degree in which the use may
prejudice the sale, or diminish the profits, or supersede the objects,
of the original work. Many mixed ingredients enter into the discus-
sion of such questions. In some cases, a considerable portion of the
material of the original work may be fused, if I may use such an
expression, into another work, so as to be undistinguishable in the
mass of the latter, which has other professed and obvious objects,
and cannot be fairly treated as a piracy; or they may be inserted as
a sort of distinct and mosaic work, into the general texture of the
8 Waring v. WDAS Broadcasting Station, 327 Pa. 433, 194 A. 631 (1937).
8a Senate Bill #597 (1967), 3 parts (hearings before subcommittee). Govt. Printing
Office.
9 Banks v. Manchester, 128 U.S. 244, 9 S. Ct. 36, 32 L. Ed. 405 (1888).
10 17 U.S.C., § 1(a) (1958).
11 17 U.S.C., §1 (1958).
12 17 U.S.C., § 1(a) (1958).
13 Rossett, Burlesque as Copyright Infringement, ASCAP Copyright Law Symposium
Nos. 9, 11 (1958).
14 Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217-218, 74 S. Ct. 460, 98 L. Ed. 630 (1954).
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second work, and constitute the peculiar excellence thereof, and then
it may be a clear piracy .... 15
This quotation and subsequent case law have developed the rule that the
taking of a substantial portion of protected material, either in quantita-
tive or qualitative terms, constitutes copyright infringement.1"
Tests of Infringement
In order to determine whether there has been substantial copying
or appropriation, the courts have developed various tests. The audience
or ordinary observer test seems to be the one most used by the courts.17
In Harold Lloyd Corp. v. Witwer 8 the court defines this test as follows,
if an ordinary person who has recently read the story sits through
the presentation of the picture, if there had been literary piracy of
the story, he should detect that fact without any aid or suggestion
or critical analysis of others. The reaction of the public to the mat-
ter should be spontaneous and immediate. 9
Under this test there is no infringement unless the appropriation is
enough to be obvious to the observer.
The economic detriment test is used also by the courts, although
financial reward to the copyright holder is only an incident of the objec-
tive of the Constitutional copyright protection.2 0 Used alone, this test
denies recovery to a plaintiff who is unable to prove an economic injury,
even though there may have been appropriation. Under this test, in-
fringement occurs when the taking substantially diminishes the value of
the original, or when the labors of the author are substantially appro-
priated by another, causing extensive injury.2 '
A critical analysis test, which involves literary classification, dis-
section and analysis of the works, is sometimes used by the courts.2 2
This test requires an expert, rather than an ordinary observer. It is used
to show that substantial appropriation may be qualitative, rather than
quantitative.
The final test is the quantitative test which arose in the equity
courts. 23 Here courts are required to dismiss the suit, if the amount ap-
15 Folsom v. Marsh, 2 F. Cas. 342 (No. 4901) (Mass. 1841).
16 West Publishing Co. v. Thompson Co., 169 F. 833 (E.D.N.Y. 1909); Harold Lloyd
Corp. v. Witwer, 65 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1933) cert. denied, 296 U.S. 669 (1933).
17 Note, Parody and Burlesque-Fair Use a Copyright Infringement?, 12 Vand. L.
Rev. 465 (1959).
18 Harold Lloyd Corp. v. Witwer, supra note 16.
19 Ibid.
20 Berlin v. E. C. Publications Inc., 219 F. Supp. 911 (S.D.N.Y. 1963), 329 F. 2d 541
(2nd Cir. 1964).
21 West Publishing Co. v. Thompson Co., supra note 16.
22 Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F. 2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930).
23 Salomon v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 44 F. Supp. 780 (S.D.N.Y. 1940).
May, 1968
3Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1968
PARODY AND BURLESQUE
propriated is not sufficient to issue an injunction against the entire work.
If the idea alone is taken, there is no infringement. A substantial portion
of the work must be taken before infringement occurs.
Fair Use
No copyright protection will be afforded, even when substantial ap-
propriation occurs, if the appropriation falls within the range of fair
use. 24 Fair use has been defined as "a privilege in others than the owner
of the copyright to use the copyrighted material in a reasonable manner
without his consent, notwithstanding the monopoly granted to the owner
by the copyright." 25 This fair use principle has long been recognized,
but no criteria have been established to define it. It has been said to be
"one of the most difficult questions which can arise for judicial consider-
ation." 26 The uncertainties involved in fair use have led the courts to
determine fair use in a particular case as a pragmatic question to be con-
sidered in light of the facts of that case solely.27 The doctrine of fair use
applies only to copyrighted works, and not to unpublished uncopyrighted
material.
28
Certain general guidelines have been suggested to limit fair use.
These criteria include the value of the part appropriated, its relative
value to each of the works in controversy, the purpose it serves in each,
and how far the copied matter will tend to supersede the original, or
interfere with its sale.
29
The problem of fair use arises in connection with scientific, legal,
and historical subject matters where it is to be expected that there will
be similarity of treatment.30 A writer may be guided by earlier copy-
righted works, may consult original authorities, and may use those
which he considers applicable in support of his own original text. How-
ever, it is generally held that if he appropriates the fruits of another's
labors without alteration and without independent research he violates
the rights of the copyright owner.31 Copying cannot be regarded as fair
use, even in cases where the infringer had no intent to infringe.3'
The most common subject matter involving the actual appropriation
of portions of the work of an author using his words without modifica-
24 Yankwich, What is Fair Use?, 22 U. Chi. L. Rev. 203 (1954).
25 Ball, The Law of Copyright and Literary Property 260 (1944).
26 Lawrence v. Dana, 15 F. Cas. 26 (No. 8136) (C.C.D. Mass. 1869).
27 Note, supra note 17.
28 MacDonald v. DuMaurier, 144 F. 2d 696 (2d Cir. 1944).
29 Carr v. National Press, 71 F. 2d 220 (D.C. Cir. 1934).
30 18 Am. Jur. 2d-Copyright and Literary Property § 109 (1965).
31 Ibid.
32 Wihtol v. Crow, 309 F. 2d 777 (8th Cir. 1962).
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tion are reviews, criticisms, and commentaries.33 This use is in keeping
with the constitutional grant of copyright to promote the progress of
science and the useful arts. The author of a copyrighted work invites
reviews, criticisms, and comments; they are instrumental to the success
of his work. No limit is placed on the extent of appropriation in a re-
view, but the reviewer may not copy so much as to reduce the demand
for the original.34 The review may not become a substitute for the work
reviewed.3
5
Basically the test for fair use contains eight elements, any one of
which may be decisive in a particular case. These elements are: "(1)
the type of use involved; (2) the intent with which it was made; (3) its
effect on the original work; (4) the amount of the user's labor involved;
(5) the benefit gained by him; (6) the nature of the work involved;
(7) the amount of the material used; and (8) its relative value." 36
Parody and Burlesque Infringement
Parody and burlesque have been recognized as forms of artistic cre-
ation since the beginning of literature. 37 The form was used by the
Greeks and Romans, coming to full fruition in Aristophanes, who used
it to mock Aeschylus and Euripides. 38 Don Quixote began as a parody
on the Spanish novel of chivalry and became a classic by creating two
of the greatest characters in literature, Don Quixote and Sancho Panza.
In England, all the great poets from Chaucer onward wrote parodies as
did the novelists, particularly Fielding, Thackeray, and Beerbohm. Bur-
lesque was strong in the nineteenth century British theater, with prac-
tically every important play bringing forth a corresponding burlesque.
In the United States parody has been written by such authors as Bret
Harte, Ogden Nash, James Thurber, J. P. Perelman, and others, down to
the present day lyrics of Allen Sherman. Parody and burlesque have
been practiced and recognized everywhere.8 9
The extent to which a parodist may borrow from a copyrighted work
which he attempts to burlesque has not been conclusively defined.40
Courts recognize that parody is the result of independent creative effort
but hold that infringement occurs if the parody covers the entire original
work.
33 Yankwich, op. cit. supra note 24.
34 Hill v. Whalen & Martell Inc., 220 F. 359 (S.D.N.Y. 1914).
35 Lawrence v. Dana, supra note 26.
36 Cohen, Fair Use in the Law of Copyright, ASCAP Copyright Law Symposium No.
6, at 53 (1955).




40 18 Am. Jur. 2d, Copyright and Literary Property, § 105 (1965).
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Berlin v. E. C. Publications, Inc.,41 decided in the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals, directly points to the above issue. Plaintiff, composer
Irving Berlin, brought suit for infringement against defendants, the pub-
lishers and employees of "Mad Magazine." The magazine as a "special
bonus" in its fourth annual edition, presented a collection of parody
lyrics to fifty-seven old standards, which were divided into categories,
such as business, sports, education, doctors and medicine, etc. After the
title of each lyric appeared either the words "Sung to the tune of -"
or "To the tune of -," and inserted in the blanks was the title of one
of the old standard songs.4 2 No music was provided in the magazine.
Plaintiff as the owner of the copyrights to twenty-five of the songs
parodied, contended that the lyrics infringed upon his copyrighted works.
The district court, on cross motion for summary judgment, held that the
parody lyrics were original, ingenious lyrics on subjects completely dis-
similar from those of plaintiff's songs and, therefore, did not infringe.
43
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed this decision,44 stating that
the parody lyrics would be permissible under the most rigorous appli-
cation of the substantiality requirement.
The opinion of the court of appeals concludes with the following:
For as a general proposition, we believe that parody and satire are
deserving of substantial freedom-both as entertainment and as a
form of social and literary criticism. As the readers of Cervantes'
"Don Quixote" and Swift's "Gulliver's Travels" or the parodies of
a modern master such as Max Beerbohm well know, many a true
word is indeed spoken in jest. At the very least, where, as here, it
is clear that the parody has neither the intent nor the effect of ful-
filling the demand for the original, and where the parodist does not
appropriate a greater amount of the original work than is necessary
to "recall or conjure up" the object of his satire, a finding of in-
fringement would be improper.45
In order to fully understand this decision, it is necessary to examine
the American cases covering the extent to which the parodist may bor-
row from the works he attempts to burlesque. The three earliest cases4"
did not deal directly with the parody of a copyrighted work, but with the
parody of a particular artist's style of performing, in which portions of
a copyrighted song were incidentally employed. In the fourth case Hill
41 Berlin v. E. C. Publications Inc., supra note 20.
42 Portions of two of the parodied lyrics were included in the district court opinion,
and show the nature of the parody.
43 Berlin v. E. C. Publications Inc., supra note 20.
44 329 F. 2d 541 (2d Cir. 1964).
45 Ibid.
46 Bloom & Hamlin v. Nixon, 125 F. 977 (E.D. Pa. 1903); Green v. Minzensheimer, 177
F. 286 (S.D.N.Y. 1909); Green v. Luby, 177 F. 287 (S.D.N.Y. 1909).
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v. Whalen & Martell Inc. 7 the defense of parody was invoked in bad
faith as an attempt to justify a taking designed substantially to diminish
a demand for the original. This case involved a stage presentation en-
titled "In Cartoonland" in which two characters entitled "Nutt & Giff"
imitated the cartoon characters "Mutt and Jeff." The court granted an
injunction and stated,
A copyrighted work is subject to fair criticism, serious or humorous.
So far as is necessary to that end, quotations may be made from it,
and it may be described by words, representations, pictures, or sug-
gestions. It is not always easy to say where the line should be drawn
between the use which for such purposes is permitted and that which
is forbidden.
One test which, when applicable, would seem to be ordinarily
decisive, is whether or not so much as has been reproduced will ma-
terially reduce the demand for the original. If it has, the rights of
the owner of the copyright have been injuriously affected. A word
of explanation will be here necessary. The reduction in demand, to
be a ground of complaint, must result from the partial satisfaction
of that demand by the alleged infringing production. A criticism of
the original work, which lessened its money value by showing that
it was not worth seeing or hearing, could not give any right of action
for infringement of copyright.
48
These early cases concede that parody may be an independent creation,
but hold it to infringe if it covers the whole work.
49
Two cases which were decided in the Southern District Court of
California, presently state the law of parody and burlesque in the United
States. These cases were Loew's Incorporated v. Columbia Broadcasting
System and Columbia Pictures Corp. v. National Broadcasting Co.51
The Loew's case was an action to enjoin the performance of a hu-
morous sketch "Autolight" burlesquing the motion picture "Gaslight,"
the literary property of Loew's, Inc. Jack Benny presented the skit on
CBS radio with Ingrid Bergman, the star of the original movie. The skit
followed the original movie closely using the same locale, setting, char-
acters, sequence of events, points of suspense, climax, and much of the
dialogue. The court granted the injunction finding that the appropriation
was substantial and could not be justified under the doctrine of fair use.
The opinion of the court concluded that the plaintiffs had a property
right in "Gaslight" which defendants could not appropriate under the
guise of fair use. The court stated "that parodized or burlesqued taking
is to be treated no differently from any other appropriation; that as in all
47 Hill v. Whalen & Martell Inc., supra note 34.
48 Ibid.
49 Yankwich, op. cit. supra note 37.
50 131 F. Supp. 165 (S.D. Cal. 1955).
51 137 F. Supp. 348 (S.D. Cal. 1955).
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other cases of alleged taking, the issue becomes one of fact, i.e., what
was taken, and how substantial the taking; and if it is determined that
there was a substantial taking, infringement exists." 52 This case holds
that parody and burlesque are to be treated no differently than any other
taking. It seems to imply that a parody would be an infringement per se,
since the amount taken to conjure up the original, must be substantial.
In the second case, Columbia Pictures Corp. v. National Broadcast-
ing Co., 53 the plaintiff sued NBC for alleged infringement of the copy-
righted motion picture "From Here to Eternity" by a burlesque entitled
"From Here to Obscurity" which starred Sid Caesar and Imogene Coca.
Judge James M. Carter, who had written the opinion in the Loew's case,
here found that there was no infringement. The skit in question did not
rely upon the original as heavily as the Loew's case did, however the
setting, general situation, plot, and details of development of the story
line were used and were obviously recognizable in the parody. The court
held that the test to be applied in determining whether a taking of a
protectible property is a substantial taking is one of quality rather than
quantity and is to be determined by the character of the work and the
relative value of the material taken.54 Since the parodist must make a
sufficient use of the original to recall or conjure up the subject matter
being parodied, the law permits more extensive use of the protected por-
tion of a copyrighted work in the creation of a burlesque than in the
creation of other fictional or dramatic works not intended as a burlesque
of the original. This right extends to the parodist the use of an incident
or some incidents of the copyrighted story, a developed character, some
small and unsubstantial parts of the development of the story, and some
small and unsubstantial amounts of the dialogue. This right does not
permit the use of the general entire story line and development of the
original with its expression, points of suspense and build up to a climax.55
The court in this case did not stress the material gain aspect that pre-
vailed in the Loew's case.
The Columbia Pictures case and the Berlin case tend to relax, a
great deal, the substantiality theory set out in the Loew's case. How-
ever, it must be remembered that because the latter case was affirmed
by the Court of Appeals56 and the United States Supreme Court,
57
although by a five to four decision, it is the decision with which parodists
must comply.
52 Loew's Incorporated v. Columbia Broadcasting System, supra note 50.
53 Columbia Pictures Corp. v. National Broadcasting Co., supra note 51.
54 Yankwich, op. cit. supra note 37.
55 Ibid.
56 239 F. 2d 532 (9th Cir. 1956).
57 356 U.S. 43, 78 S. Ct. 667, 2 L. Ed. 2d 583 (1958).
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Conclusion
Parody, under an accepted definition, is a type of composition which
seeks in good faith to criticize, mock, ridicule, and distort the intellectual
product of another, and not to imitate or reproduce it as written.5s The
decisions in the Columbia Pictures and Berlin cases in part stem from
the growing realization of the courts that parody and burlesque are inde-
pendent intellectual endeavors, and must be preserved as a valid form
of social and literary criticism in our society.
The doctrine of fair use must be expanded to allow the parodist sub-
stantial freedom to use the elements of the original work necessary to
conjure up the object of his satire. While the property right of the author
or composer must be protected, the courts should recognize that parody
and burlesque are valid art forms, and as such are also deserving of
protection.
The test to determine infringement must be of a qualitative nature.
In each case the parody must be examined to determine whether it is
an independent intellectual creation or merely an attempt to use the
original author's work for the parodist's personal gain.
In the Berlin case the court sets forth a proposition which should
form the basis for future development of the areas of parody and bur-
lesque in their relation to the copyright holder.
... as a general proposition .... parody and satire are deserving of
substantial freedom-both as entertainment and as a form of social
and literary criticism ... (and) .. . courts . . . must occasionally sub-
ordinate the copyright holder's interest in a maximum financial re-
turn to the greater public interest in the development of art, science,
and industry.59
58 Yankwich, op. cit. supra note 37, at 1153.
59 Berlin v. E. C. Publications Inc., supra note 20.
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